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The purpose o-f this research project is to examine the
cost behavior o-f the Naval Air Rework Facility, Alameda,
Cali-fornia, aircra-ft program in relation to variations in
aircra-ft rework workloads, and to develop cost—volume
relationships useable in support o-f pricing and workload
decisions. Analysis o-f four years o-f quarterly direct and
indirect cost data provided the base -from which total
cost-volume models were derived -for the four aircraft program
segments (A-6, P-3, S-3, and A-3)
.
The results of this study indicate that significant
cost-volume relationships exist not only with the direct
costs but also with many associated indirect aircraft program
costs. The study further suggests that other factors, such
as rate and direction of volume changes and levels of
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The purpose o-f this research project is to explore the
e-f-fects o-f aircra-ft workload variations on costs incurred in
the aircraft rework program o-f the Naval Air Rework Facility
(NARF)
,
Alameda, Cali-fornia. Through the examination and
analysis o-f quarterly historical data, speci-fic cost-volume
relationships are -formulated -for the direct and indirect
costs in each o-f the -four aircra-ft program segments (A—6,
P—3, S-3, A—3) . These relationships are then assembled into
average cost—volume models useable as decision support aids
in selecting cost-e-f -f icient workloads and estimating aircraft
rework prices.
B. HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
1 . Unique Constraints
NARF Alameda is a very large and complex industrial
activity saddled with some highly unique, government
controlled constraints. First, as in all government
operations, it is a not-for-profit organization expected to
execute its budget to within \'/. of that appropriated.
Secondly, it is driven by the monumental objective of
"service to the fleet" which means it is obligated to adapt
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to all sorts o-f unexpected changes, respond to operational
necessities and emergencies, and work around the resultant
productivity inefficiencies and irreversible -Financial
losses- Thirdly, NARF Alameda has much less -flexibility than
similar corporate industrial activities due in part to an
extremely procedure-laden^ civilian personnel structure,
budget restricted personnel ceilings, periodic congressional
hiring -freezes, non—competi ti ve wages for skilled labor, and
a serious 1 abor /supervi sor wage inversion problem. These
handicaps severely restrict management control of short term
production driven labor adjustments, work force stability and
productivity, and depth of supervisory experience. And
fourthly, NARF Alameda's cost structure is close to 50/1
indirect (overhead), most of which is very inflexible due to
many of the aforementioned constraints.
2. Fixed Price Constaint
As if NARF management didn't have enough restrictions
limiting their control, the Naval Air Systems Command, who
has the overall resource allocation responsibi 1 ty for
aircraft rework, established the fixed price concept and rate
stabilization system in 1975 in an attempt to improve
uniformity of rework costs for fleet and other customers and
simplify the budget estimation process CRef. l:pp. 2,10,13D.
The rate stabilization system leads to problems because NARF
must initiate the complicated budgeting process 18 months
prior to the budgeted fiscal year. Estimating a realistic
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fixed price per type aircra-ft, missile or engine etc., that
-far in the -future is dif-ficult- Some adjustments -for
inflation and local labor rates are made during the budgeting
process, but regardless of how the original production
schedule may change to meet the actual needs o-f the -fleet
NARF is totally committed^ to the established -fixed prices.
Workload schedules are produced using projected
direct labors hours available and established labor hour
norms per aircra-ft. Since the actual workload is constantly
being changed (due to overriding considerations o-f constantly
changing operational requirements), it's highly possible that
actual per aircra-ft costs may vary drastically. However,
this is not considered and the NARF receives the -fixed price
regardless. When actual production is less than scheduled,
losses are explainable. When actual production is greater
than scheduled, the mind-set is per aircra-ft costs should be
less and there-fore the budget variances should be positive.
Out o-f 103 A-6 ' s completed over the past four years,
only 22 have either broken even or been under their
established fixed price. Of these 22, 18 were salvaged from
red ink by severe underusages of estimated materials. This
is not an attempt to imply that workload fluctuations and
fixed prices are the only reasons for cost overruns in the
aircraft program, but it is certainly a distinct possibility
that they are major contributors.
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The -fixed price constraint is one of the reasons the
NARF Alameda Deputy Comptroller requested this study. I-f the
ideal situation existed where management had -full control and
was not subject to the personnel and other constraints, then
it is conceivable that each aircra-ft could be processed for
the agreed -fixed price. Also, if NARF aircraft inductions
were scheduled at a relatively constant level, then again an
actual break-even (zero profit or loss) situation is
conceivable. Unfortunately, the nature of the personnel and
workload scheduling problems will probably never change.
3. Management Needs
The NARF Alameda Deputy Comptroller is interested in
the cost-volume relationships for the various types of
aircraft and how fluctuations in workloads contribute to
NARF'S ills. He feels that the cost behaviors differ
extensively between aircraft types and the cost of reworking
any particular aircraft may be dependent on the number and
mix of aircraft in production. Having knowledge of the
effects of production volume on the rework costs of a
particular aircraft type would be an invaluable tool in
deciding the workload level, estimating per aircraft costs,





Through the analysis o-f historical data, can a
reasonably reliable relationship between aircra-Ft workload
and related costs be ascertained -for the aircra-ft program as
a whole and -for each of i-ts -four segments? To answer this
question, a representative measure o-f volume must be derived
and all aircra-ft rework related costs identified, separated
as to type of aircraft, and examined for volume related
behavior.
2. Subsidiary
If the primary research question can be answered and
relationships determined, the following subsidiary objectives
will be accomplished:
(1) Develop cost-volume models for the aircraft program
and its four segments
(2) Explore the effects of volume increases and decreases
on program and segment costs.
(3) Use break—even analysis to compare revenues and costs
and to evaluate relative profitability of the four
aircraft program segments.
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
The emphasis of this thesis is on matching actual
quarterly costs and representative quarterly production
activity measures for each of the four basic aircraft types
for the period FY82-FY85 and analyzing their historical
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cost-volume relationships. Although there are several models
within each aircra-ft type, and some have very di-F-ferent
rework requirements, all aircraft within each type are
considered equivalent for the purposes of this project. A
fifth aircraft type, the C-118, of which about seven were
reworked in FY82, is not analyzed but is included in overall
aircraft program figures.
To properly develop a predictive cost-volume model,
the influence of other environmental factors on cost-volume
behavior must be included. Some of these factors are
discussed when evaluating the cost-volume results in Chapter
IV, but due to limited data, development of specific
relationships is not within the scope of this project.
2. Limitations
Availability of a sufficient number of years of all
types of required data limited the study to 16 quarterly
periods, well below the statistically desirably 30 data
periods. This did not prevent reasonable analysis, but did
restrict the level of outcome reliability and the possibility
of discovering significant underlying relationships.
Indirect costs are a sizeable portion of aircraft
rework costs, yet most are allocated and few are traceable to
the aircraft program. No indirect costs are traceable to an
aircraft type. Without the ability to identify any indirect
costs by type aircraft, the possibility of observing any
differential effects between aircraft types is lost.
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3. Assumpti ons
Within the time -frame o-f the historical data being
used, some changes have occurred at NARF Alameda. These
include minor accounting policies, rede-f ini tion o-f some
overhead functional cost catagories, and reorganization o-f
some cost centers- These changes are assumed not to a-f-fect
the results o-f this project.
Numerous descrepenci es were discovered in direct and
indirect cost data during data collection. Ones that were
signi-ficant in nature and could not be reconciled are assumed
to be inaccurate and are removed from analysis where
appropriate. The remainder of the data is assumed to be
error free and to have been recorded using consistent
methods. It also is assumed that all costs that occurred
within a quarter were recorded in that quarter. This last
assumption may be unrealistic, but hopefully the lag in




The princpal method of analysis used is simple linear
regression. Using matched costs and production activity
measures, regression is applied to direct labor, material and
other services costs, and indirect costs determined to
possibly exhibit variable relations with volume. Regression
of these costs are attempted with several different activity
17
measures in order to discover the ones most related to costs.
Using cost-volume theory, speci-fic cost-volume relationships
Are developed -for the ai rcra-ft program and each o-f its four
segments.
Cost and volume data were collected through the
assistance o-f the Comptroller Division o-f the Management
Controls Department. Hard copy Production Per-formance
Reports, individual Job Order Summaries, Physical Completion
Reports, and Cost Center Summaries were used to assemble
direct costs by aircra-ft type, job order costs by job number,
aircra-ft days in process, and cost center data respectively.
The ICMS Dbase -files* were used to extract and analyze
pertinent indirect costs by Functonal Cost Catagory (FCC).
Interviews were conducted with NARF department heads and
some division managers to acheive a better understanding o-f
cost and workload considerations.
Literature searches were conducted through Dudley Knox
library. Text books and periodical and journal articles on
cost estimation techniques, indirect cost theory, cost-volume
analysis and break—even analysis were consulted.
F. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Although the reliability o-f results is somewhat in
question, reasonable cost-volume models Are attainable and
*The Indirect Cost Management System was developed -for
NARF Alameda by General Management Systems o-f Lexington Park,
Md.
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shoM some interesting di-f-f erences among aircra-ft types. The
measurements o-f production activity -found to be the most
related to segment costs and most identi-f i able with a
meaning-Ful measure o-f aircra-ft workload were aircra-ft
workdays per quarter and an equivlent measure o-f aircra-ft
completions per quarter. Direct labor demonstrated the most
Siccurate variable relationship, as expected, but direct
material and other direct services exhibited unexpectedly
poor variable relationships. Other direct services data were
so inconsistent that they were considered to be -fixed costs
-for development o-f the cost—volume models. Several indirect
costs were -found to have partial variable relationships with
volume. Finally, some inferences were made as to the e-f-fects
o-f direction, rate and duration o-f quarterly volume changes
as they relate to cost behavior.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The remaining chapters lead the reader through the data
analysis and model -formulation accomplished by the author.
First, background in-formation on the Naval Air Rework
Facility System is provided in Chapter II and a brie-f
discussion o-f cost behavior, cost-volume and break—even
theoretical concepts are covered in Chapter III. Next,
Chapter IV describes the possible volume measurements and the
type and distributions o-f costs associated with the aircra-ft
program. Chapter V leads the reader step by step through the
19
regression analysis o-f the cost-volume relationships o-F both
direct and indirect costs -for all -four aircra-ft types, and
presents the resultant cost-volume models. Also included in
Chapter IV is a discussion o-f the application o-f the
relationships and an evaluation o-f the e-ffects o-f other
-factors on cost behavior. Chapter VI compares costs with
revenues through break-even analysis and demonstrates the
use-fulness o-f this technique in aiding managerial workload
decisions. And lastly, Chapter VII presents some general
conclusions and some specific recommendations to NARF Alameda
-for improvement o-f future analyses and their use.
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II. NAVAL AIR REWORK FACILITY SYSTEM
A. THE NARF MISSION
The primary mission of NARF Alameda is to provide
"service to the -fleet" in the -form of depot level maintenance
on designated operational assets in a timely manner and at
minimum cost. Depot level (D-level) maintenance is the most
far—ranging of the three maintenance levels in the Department
of the Navy (DON). D—level maintenance is designed to
perform the more complicated and extensive repair and rework
functions not within the scope of intermediate level
(I-level) or organizational level (0—level) maintenance
operations.
0-level and I-level organizations perform preventive and
minor component replacement and repair maintenance on
operational fleet equipment. NARF provides in field
assistance to I-level and 0—level organizations when unusual
repair or damage circumstances occur. Otherwise, NARF '
s
superior in-house facilities and technical capabilities Are
utilized to provide a wide range of rework and overhaul
maintenance; as well as complete rebuilding and
manufacturing of parts and assemblies, performing major




NARF Alameda's industrial operations are separated into
five major programs; aircra-ft, engines, missiles, components,
and other support activities. Each o-f these programs
comprises a varied workload mix. The Aircra-Ft program
involves -four basic types of aircraft (with several different
models and series of each type): the P—3 Orion, a large four
engine turbo—prop, shorebased, anti-submarine aircraft; the
A—6 Intruder, a cairrier based, twin jet engine, all weather
attack bomber; the S-3 Viking, a carrier based, twin wing
mounted turbo-fan jet, anti-submarine aircraft; and the A-3
Skywarrior, a large carrier capable, twin wing mounted jet,
electronic surveilence and reserve training aircraft. The
Engine program consists of the T-56 , J-52 (P—S) , TF—34, and
501K-17 engines as well as numerous auxilary power units.
The Missile program overhauls the Sparrow, Shrike and Phoenix
missile guidance and control sections. The Component program
handles hundreds of various aeronautical component systems
and subassemblies (eg. landing gear, flaps, radios, radars,
and engine accessories). The Other Support program includes
such activities as field repair and modification, shipboard
repair of catapult systems and other equipment, fleet test
equipment calibration, fleet training and technical
assistance, and parts manufacturing.
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C. MANAGEMENT OF DEPOT LEVEL INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES
NARF Alameda is classi-fied as an industrial activity o-f
the Naval Shore Establishment. All NARFs are o-f -fici ally
designated as Naval Aviation Industrial Establishments and,
along with the commercial activities contracted to do depot
level maintenance, comprise the naval aviation D—level
Industrial Program. CRef. 3:p. 2-43
NARF Alameda is directly responsible to and under the
support o-f Commander, Naval Aviation Logistics Center (NALC)
,
Patuxent River, Md. NALC provides and controls the NARF's
operating +unds, personnel ceilings, industrial equipment and
tooling, material support, and management assistance. NALC
is accountable to Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) -for the
coordination, management and execution o-f all naval aviation
D-level Industrial Programs. NAVAIR is responsible to the
Chie-f o-f Naval Operations (OPNAV) ^^or the overall planning
and development o-f naval aviation resources to meet material
support requirements -for the active and reserve -forces o-f the
Navy and Marine Corps. CRe-f. 3: pp. 2—5 - 2—63
D. NARF DEPARTMENTAL ORGANIZATION
The organizational structure o-f NARF Alameda resembles
that o-f a matrix organization. Top management positions are
military billets that create a military chain o-f
responsibility between the civilian department heads and the
Commanding Of-ficer in the overall execution o-f the various
23
department -functions. There are seven departments in all,
two under the Management Resources Director, two under





The 2000 Management Controls Department, the head of
which is also the Deputy Comptroller, is responsible -for
maintaining the -financial management program and the
management in-formation system, and administering the Navy
Industrial Fund (NIF) budgeting and accounting system. CRe-f.
4:p. 3-lD
The 7000 Material Management Department is
responsible -for overall facility material planning and
support and acts as the material policy advisor and inventory
control authority CRef. 4:p. 18— ID. This department was
established beginning the 3rd quarter FY83 in an attempt to
improve overall material support.
2. Quality and Reliability
« The 8000 Flight Check Department is comprised o-f all
military personnel and is charged with the administration of
the military personnel programs. Operational
responsibilities involve the coordination of flight check
operations for all reworked aircraft. CRef. 4: p. 18— 1
J
The 4000 Quality and Reliability Assurance Department
is responsible for providing product quality and reliability
recommendations to NESO (NAVAIR Engineering Support Office,
24
NARF Division 9100), discovering poor workmanship, and
ensuring the end product meets or exceeds NARF standards o-f
quality. Many o-f the divisions in this department work
closely with production divisions in verifying quality o-f
work and investigating Aircra-ft Descrepency Reports (ADRs)
and Quality De-ficiency Reports (QDRs) . CRe-f. 4: p. 3-2D
3. Production
The 5000 Production Planning and Control Department
is responsible for three basic functions: examination and
evaluation (E S< E) of the material condition of installed
systems; production control of in-process products; and
workload planning and estimating. This department is one of
the most important staff functions of NARF and coordinates
meticulously with the Production Department. CRef. 4:pp. 3—3D
For instance, the 5500 Aircraft Planning and Control Division
has branch managers and supervisors dedicated to specific
types of aircraft (A-6, P-3, etc.) who monitor the sequences
of operations, regulate and obtain needed materials, control
work in process for aircraft parts, and maintain a work
control center for each type aircraft CRef. 5D.
The 6000 Production Engineering Department is
responsible for four basic functions; operations analysis,
methods and standards, facilities and equipment engineering,
and plant services. This department works closely with NESO
and Production Planning with respect to establishing rework
standards and workload production schedules based on their
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analysis o-f rework task procedures and estimated labor times.
It is responsible for plant layout, coordination o-f plant
improvements, and preventive and corrective maintenance o-f
production equipment. CRe-f. 4: pp. 3—4 - 3-5D
The 9000 Production Department is responsible -for the
direct accomplishment o-f the NARF workload. All other
departments within NARF exist only to assist the Production
Department in producing a quality product in reasonable time
and at minimum cost. The Production Department is split into
six divisions; 9100 NESO, 9200 Weapon Systems Manager (WSM)
,
9300 Metal and Process, 9400 Avionics, 9500 Airframes, and
9600 Power Plants. CRe-f. 4: p. 3-53
Approximately 85X o-f all NARF direct labor is
accomplished by 9300, 9400, 9500 and 9600 divisions which
employs 45X o-f NARF's employees. The 9500 Air-frames Division
is the major aircra-ft program contributor with 74/1 o-f this
programs direct labor hours.
E. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
1 . Fiscal Planning
Fiscal planning for NARF Alameda is a very critcal
and continuous process that centers around the development
and execution of three budgets: the NIF A-11 Budget, which
consists of the annual operational costs for the entire naval
aviation D-level Industrial Program; the annual NIF Funding
Budget, which further defines all NARF workloads and
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operating funds and is negotiated and updated at the
quarterly Fleet Readiness Support Meetings (FRSMs) ; and the
quarterly NARF Operating Budget which is used to measure each
NARF's performance.
The Naval Industrial Fund (NIF) is used to -finance
all NARF operating and inventory costs except government
furnished material (GFM) and other statistical costs. The
NIF is a revolving fund designed to be self —sustaining and,
through reinbursements by customer's appropriated funds,
approach a break—even situation by the end of the fiscal
year. CRef. 3: pp. 4-1 - 4-23
2. Budgeting Cycle
The naval aviation D—level Industrial Program
budgeting cycle begins 18 months (April XI) prior to the
beginning of the budgeted fiscal year (FYX3 beginning October
X2). NALC and all six NARFs meet with NAVAIR to estimate
FYX3 workloads, basic costs and other requirements necessary
to outline the initial framework for the FYX3 A— 11 Budget.
Using these projections, the NARFs spend the next couple
months formulating their inputs to be submitted to NALC in
June XI. NALC then assembles the entire Industrial Program
A-11 Budget and submits it up the chain of command to
eventually become part of the President's budget proposal to
Congress. CRef. 63
The next step occurs at the 2nd quarter FYX2 FRSM in
February X2. NALC and NARF management negotiate factors
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concerning aircraft, missile and engine schedules, unit
norms, personnel ceilings, direct/indirect ratios, overtime
percentages, hourly labor rates and material unit costs CRe-f.
71. These Ar& balanced with the NARF ' s projected expenses
and workload capacity estimates and -funds expected to be
available through the A-11 Budget. The results o-f these
negotiations become the initial set o-f -funding rates for the
FYX3 NIP Funding Budget. Also during this FRSM, and every
other quarterly FRSM, renegotiation on workload for the next
and remaining quarters of the current fiscal year is
accomplished and becomes the basis for developing each NARF's
next quarter Operating Budget. CRef. 6D
During the May X2 FRSM all rates, norms, ratios and
ceilings ^r^ finalized and become stabilized from that point
on. Now NALC can determine the fixed prices for particular
aircraft and engines etc. and publish these to its customers.
Using these norms and stabilized rates, the NARFs develop
their FYX3 annual NIF Funding and 1st quarter FYX3 Operating
Budgets. At the August X2 FRSM, final negotiation on workload
takes place to coincide with the funding and other guidelines
in the Defense Authorization Bill (which should have been
passed by this time).
At this point NARF Alameda management coordinates the
internal distribution of the NIF Funding Budget and finalizes
their Ist quarter Operating Budget. Generally the Operating
Budget is completed and submitted to NALC prior to the
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beginning o-f FYX3. The Operating Budget is used by NALC to
evaluate NARF
'
s performance; there-Fore, the execution o-f the
Operating Budget is crucial to the NARF's overall viewed
success.
The NARF financial managers cannot overemphasize the
importance o-f the quarterly FRSM negotiations that ultimately
result in the Operating budget. There are numerous variables
that the NARF must thoroughly research prior to each FRSM and
be prepared to de-fend in order to attain a workload schedule
and -fiscal budget that are realistic and executable. The
more directions from which these variables can be examined
and defended, such as cost-volume analysis, the greater
possibility of success.
F. THE AIRCRAFT PROGRAM
1 . Types of D—level Maintenance
Fleet, reserve and RDT&E aircraft are scheduled for
D—level maintenance at periodic intervals o\'er their service
life in order to ensure that their material condition remains
well within safe and acceptable limits. Naval aircraft are
subjected to particularly deteriorating conditions through
carrier operations and highly corrosive environments.
0-level preventative maintenance is continually performed and
a series of physical integrity inspections, called corrosion
control inspections, aire conducted to ensure satisfactory.
safe per-f ormance during the aircraft's service period
(interval between successive D-level rework).
There are several reasons an aircraft is scheduled
for NARF D-level maintenance. There are four major
catagories that comprise almost all of NARF's in—house rework
accomplished. CRef. 3:pp. 10-1 - 10-23
a. Standard Depot Level Maintenance
Standard Depot Level Maintenance (SDLM) is the
most common rework accomplished, for each aircra-ft undergoes
SDLM several times during its service life, scheduled at
intervals (service periods) determined by flight hours,
service months, and engineering studies. The extent of
maintenance to be accomplished is defined by the SDLM
specifications developed by the Cognizant Field Activity
(CFA) for each type/model /series (TMS) of aircraft. Work
done on an aircraft is limited to the airframes structure
only. Rework is done on installed systems only if it's part
of the structure and not removable. If at all possible, each
aircraft is to leave with the exact same set of accessories
and components it arrived with. Removable components needing
rework, such as engines and black boxes, are replaced and
routed through their own D-level program.
b. Service Life Extension
The Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) is a
SDLM program that involves major replacement or restoration
of aircraft structures that have reached fatigue life limits.
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The A—3 is a prime example o-f this where extension o-f its
service life has been determined to be necessary in order to
meet operational and reserve training missions. This type of
D-level maintenance is extremely difficult and requires three
to four times the hours of a normal SDLM.
c. Modification and Airframe Change
Modification (MOD) and Airframe Change (AFC)
D—level maintenances are performed as required by technical
directives (TDs) designed to alter the perforfnance or
capabilities of an aircraft without changing its model or
series designation. This work may be accomplished by field
teams but is most often fulfilled concurrently with SDLM
rework.
d. Conversion
Conversion (CONV) is a major alteration of the
mission of the aircraft and results in a model or series
redesi gnation. This is usually accomplished as a combination
SDLM/CONV depot level effort.
e- Summary
Almost without exception, aircraft physically
inducted at NARF Alameda are scheduled for either SDLM/AFC,
SDLM/MOD, SDLM/CONV, or straight SDLM rework. Most of the




When an aircra-ft is received at NARF Alameda, it is
inducted as scheduled and a job number established. From
this point on direct labor hours and other costs are charged
to the aircra-ft. Two aircraft examiners are immediately
assigned to the aircra-ft ±0 perform ground tests of all
aircraft systems equipment and record discrepencies before
defueling and moving the aircraft into the hangar. These
examiners stay with the aircraft through the initial
disassembly stages. They determine what technical directives
are required and through the use of the SDLM specifications
for that TMS, determine the tailored fixed load of specific
SDLM tasks that must be performed on the aircraft. CRef. 83
It is seldom necessary for an aircraft to need all
possible SDLM tasks achieved. Using the established norms
for each SDLM task (determined NARF-wide during the A-11
budgeting process), the exact number of direct labor hours
projected to complete rework is calculated. According to
NARF management, the fixed load is usually less than the
number of hours on which the fixed price was based CRef. 6D.
This is an accepted inconsistency, however, for it is also
quite common to discover further corrosion or safety of
flight rework not included in the fixed load that must be
completed.
To explain further what norms are, consider the
following simplified example. For the SDLM task of "fuel
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cell removal" -for a P-3C, the task norm is 540 direct labor
hours. ^ This -figure is arrived at through operational
analysis and methods and standards surveys. Using an
estimated e-f-ficiency index o-f .82 and an expected occurrance
rate o-f this task of .68, the final weighted task norm is
(540/. 82) X .68 or 448 hours. Summing all the SDLM weighted
tasks norms for P-3Cs will then create the overall norm for
determining the fixed price at the FRSMs. To determine the
fixed load for a specific P-3C, if fuel cell removal were
needed, then it would be estimated to take 540/. 82 or 658
hours. Summing all SDLM tasks required for this aircraft
gives the actual fixed load. The fixed load is what
production managers use to monitor rework progress. The
norms (in direct hours and dollars) are what the financial
managers use for tracking their financial position.
The physical flow of aircraft within the hangars
differs some by type. The S—3s and A—6s use a semi -garage
method. Aircraft are moved only once or twice during rework
and once to the paint shop. The A—35 are handled garage
style and remain in the same spot almost their entire rework
period until painting. The P—3s travel through a moving
line. They are spotted for 7-10 days then moved to the next
^The example is for illustration only. All values are
fictitious and have no resemblance to actual P-3C norms.
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station. The moving line method makes it easier -for a
manager to observe how turnaround time is tracking, but since
any delay on one aircra-ft delays all those behind it,
meticulous planning o-f task accomplishment and material
support is absolutely critical.
The process is completed once the aircra-ft is painted
and it passes a series of operational flight checks by Navy
pilots and aircrewmen. This marks the end o-f rework and the
aircra-ft is considered physically complete and ready to be
turned over to -ferry crews for the return to the customer.
Financial completion (close out of the job number) may not
occur for two more months due to lagging accumulations of
costs.
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III. COST BEHAVIOR THEORY
Costs ^re a measurement o-f the value b-F resources and
services. Volume is a measure o-f activity or Morkload
resulting -From the consumption o-f resources and services.
Anyone who has ever been a manager has at some time been
concerned with costs, workload and cost e-f -f iciency. As was
stated earlier, NARF's goal is to provide quality maintenence
on time and at minimum cost to its customers.
Every organization, whether private or public, pro-fit or
non—pro-fit, in some -fashion consumes its own resources or
services in order to acquire other resources or services. To
achieve desired objectives, it's vital -for managers to
thoroughly understand in what manner their resouces are being
consumed. Recorded accounting cost data represents the "means
by which managers can receive this -feedback. To e-f -f ecti vel y
use this data, managers need to know which costs under their
control should vary in relation to changes in the volume o-f
activities they manage and which should not. Whether
evaluating the bene-fits o-f several alternative investments,
attempting to minimize costs o-f existing -functions, or
optimizing workload and product mix, cost behavior can
provide invaluable insight to the manager.
This chapter will provide the reader with the basic
theory on which cost-volume analysis is based. More detailed
explanations will accompany the NARF Alameda cost-volume
analysis discussed in later chapters.
A. TYPES OF COSTS
The total cost o-f operating an organization or any
element o-f an organization—department, program, or cost
center is the sum o-f a variety of types and catagories o-f
costs. Cost behavior can be described by three basic
patterns: variable, -fixed and mixed.
Variable costs Are those that vary proportionally with
some measure o-f volume. Examples o-f variable costs are
direct labor, direct material and other uses o-f resources
that Are closely associated with producing the cost objective
or output. True variable costs display a relatively linear
relationship with volume and thus a constant cost per unit o-f
volume. CRe-f. 9: p. 361
D
Fixed costs are those that do not vary at all with volume
and either remain relatively constant over time or vary for
reasons totally unrelated to volume. Examples of fixed costs
are supervisory salaries, building depreciation, and other
costs that increase during a period only because of the
passage of time. Attempting to relate fixed costs to output
may result in an unrealistic per unit value; for example, as
the volume of output increases, the cost per unit decreases.
CRef. 9: pp. 361-362:
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Mixed costs (or sometimes called semi variable costs) have
both variable and fixed components. There-fore, mixed costs
do vary with changes in volume, but proportionally less.
Examples o-f mixed costs are indirect labor, equipment
maintenance, and clerical services. CRe-f. 10:p. 122]
Two other important catagorizations o-F costs ars direct
and indirect. Direct costs e^re those that are readily
identifiable to the unit of output and can be either variable
or fixed (normally variable). Indirect costs (commonly
referred to as overhead) are those that are not traceable
directly to a unit of output and are usually fixed or mixed.
B. COST-VOLUME ANALYSIS
Cost—volume analysis is a method by which one can use
historical data to assist in predicting the behavior of costs
in the future. By analyzing the various direct and indirect
costs associated with producing a certain output, a
determination can be made as to their behavior —variable,
fixed or mixed— in relation to volume. By no means is the
past a perfect predictor of the future; in fact, at best it
can only be a rough guess. Causal factors and conditions
differ from one data collection period to the next. One
cannot mathematically remove or hold perfectly constant these
conditions while studying the effects on costs of only one
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(in this case volume). However, as long as this -fact is kept
in mind, knowledge o^ historical cost behavior can be o-f some
managerial value.
Collecting data on particular costs and volume
measurements over equivalent time periods is the -first step
in cost-volume analysis. To be meaning-ful, the data should
have been recorded under consistent procedures so as to have
some assurance that the numerical values represent comparable
quantities. For instance, cost data should have been
collected under the same accounting rules, and volume data
through standard methods o-f measurements. It is also
important to convert cost data into time constant monetary
values. Indexes such as the "Implicit Price De-flators for
Gross National Product" (although not per-fect) will remove
most o-f the e-f-Fects o-f in-flation. The scatter plot is the
result o-f graphically displaying the cost-volume data points.
This provides a rough obervation o-f how the costs o-f interest
vary with volume.
For a more accurate evaluation o-f the cost-volume
relationship, regression analysis (which uses the
least-squares method) can be applied to the data. As
illustrated in Figure 3.1, considering the cost data as the
dependent variable (y—axis) and the volume data as the
independent variable (x—axis), a linear approximation o-f the
relationship is modeled by an equation o-f the form:








Figure 3.1 Linear Regression
The value Y^ represents the expected cost value given any
volume X. As stated earlier, it is not possible to predict
the exact cost behavior in relation to volume, so Yc
describes only an average approximation and does not totally
"explain" the behavior o-f Y. The "unexplained" portion is
the di-f-ference between the actual and predicted values
(Y - Yc ) and is called the error term or residual "e" giving
the equation:
Y = a + bX + e
The least—squares method used in regression analysis
minimizes the error terms and thus provides the best possible
fit o-f a straight line to the data. CRe-f. 11: pp. 2,311
A cost-volume curve is the results o-f the regression
analysis. Since all costs are either variable, -fixed or
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mixed, then analysis o-f each will result in variable and/or
fixed components. Figure 3.2 shows a mixed cost with

























Figure 3.2 Cost-Volume Curve
The relevant range shown is the range o-f volumes -for
which the linear relationship can be considered valid. The
extension o-f this relationship to zero volume outside o-f the
relevant range is only -for the purpose o-f identi-fying the
intercept (the -fixed component o-f cost), and does not imply a
linear relationship over this range.
It must be kept in mind that the cost—volume linearity
assumption, even within the relevant range, may be totally
incorrect. Costs may vary by some higher order relationship
or they may vary in a discontinuous manner such as a step
-function. However, as stated by Robert N. Anthony:
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. . . the e-f-fect of these discontinuities or nonlinear cost
-functions on the total costs is minor, and the assumption
that total costs vary in a linear relationship with volume
is a satisfactory working approximation . . . C-for]





A cost-volume model is a very simplified representation
of a series of very complex relationships. First of all, the
whole relationship is highly dependent on the choice of
volume measurement. Anthony says, "... a certain measure
Cof volume] is selected because it most closely reflects the
conditions that cause costs to change." CRef. 9:p. 376D The
cost-volume relationship explained by linear regression says
nothing about the causal factors of cost behavior involved.
Therefore, it is extremely important to select a
representative measure of volume—whether it be based on
resource consumption (inputs), work accomplished (outputs),
dollar values or physical units. For example, Anthony feels,
".
. . overhead costs tend to vary more closely with other
input factors than with output." CRef. 9:p. 376D It's
possible then that for different costs, different measures of
volume may be appropriate.
Product mix is another factor to consider, for cost may
vary over a period as a result of the variations in the mix
of several products being produced over that period. When
product unit costs are different, it is best to treat each
product separately and construct cost-volume curves for each.
CRef. 9:p. 3833
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other considerations that should be investigated when
evaluating the reasons -for cost behavior Arez (1) rate o-f
volume change, for costs tend to exhibit larger error terms
(deviations from the cost-volume curve) under rapidly
changing volume; (2) direction o-f volume changes, -for costs
tend to lag behind volume changes; (3) duration o-f change in
volume, -for costs react less to temporary volume changes than
to longer ones; (4) advanced knowledge o-f volume changes, -for
managers Sire able to anticipate required adjustments
resulting in costs tending to be more in concert with volume;
(5) productivity changes, -for costs will vary inversely with
productivity variations; and (6) management decisions, for
many costs are discretionary in nature and solely dependent
on a manager's judgement. CRef. 9: pp. 383,384D
Because of all these possible real world variables, one
cannot expect to estimate future costs solely by predicting
the volume for a specific period of time. The cost-volume
relationship is a significantly valuable analytical tool, but
its application has to be moderated with common sense and a
good understanding of the effects of these other factors.
C. BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS
The break-even point is defined as that level of volume
at which the revenues received are equal to the costs
incurred.
I-f :
V» = Break-even volume
Cs/ = Variable cost per unit
Cs = Sales price per unit
CfT = Fixed costs
then:
Vb = C^ / (Co - Cv)
Fixed costs must be matched with the varialble revenue gain
(called contribution margin) in order to break-even.
There-fore, knowing the contribution margin per unit (sales
revenue per unit less variable costs per unit) the volume of
activity needed to cover fixed costs can be determined. As
displayed in Figure 3.3, if volume is below break—even (where
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Figure 3.3 Break-even Analysis
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As can be seen in Figure 3.3, break-even analysis is
simply an extension o-f cost-volume analysis: comparing the
revenue—volume relationship with cost—volume. A non—pro-fit
organization such as a NARF, who has break-even as a goal,
should always be striving (theoretically) for the break-even
volume.
O-f course, just as with costs, revenues Are affected by
factors other than just volume. The product mix is probably
the most important to a NARF. Product mix will vary revenue
through different product prices (aircraft TMS in NARF's
case). Market demand and the resulting fluctuations in sales
volume (rates and directions of change etc.) may affect
pricing decisions. However, since NARF works on a fixed pric«
system, variations due to market demand are removed and
volume changes will not affect revenues as they do costs.
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IV. VOLUME AND COST DESCRIPTIONS
A. VOLUME MEASUREMENT
1. Qualities o-f a Volume Measurement
The -first step, and possibly the most important, in
studying the cost-volume relationships o-f the NARF Alameda
aircra-ft program is determining suitable volume measurements.
Volume, the dependent variable in this situation, is not as
easily de-finable as one would initially suspect. To be both
meaning-ful and use-ful to management a volume dimension should
have certain qualities such as: (1) simple to understand; (2)
easily and consistently measurable; <3) relatable to input or
output; (4) controlable by management; (5) representative of
actual production activity; (6) accurately predictable; and
(7) equivalent across product lines. There is probably no
production activity measure that would per-fectly meet all
these requirements.
2. Possible Volume Measures
Quarterly activity measures which can possibly meet
some o-f these requirements -for the aircra-ft program are
aircra-ft inductions, aircra-ft completions, direct personnel ,
direct labor hours, and aircra-ft in production. Combinations
o-f these to be considered are aircra-ft per quarter (an
equivalent unit based on percent completion) and hours per
aircra-ft (a productivity value).
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a. Inductions and Completions
Probably the least suitable volume measures are
inductions and completions. These are certainly related to
input and output, but fail to accurately represent the actual
quarterly production activity. An induction or completion
may occur at anytime duriT»g the quarter, so no consistent
measurement is possible. Being small interger values make
them inappropriate -for sensative analysis. Inductions and
completions Mould have a better chance o-f being a valid
measure on an annual basis.
b. Direct Personnel
The number o-f direct personnel associated with
the aircra-ft program, primarily within the 9500 Air-frames
Division, is de-finitely related to production activity or at
least production capacity. However, control is di-f-ficult,
for this measurement is severely limited by the constraints
involved in adjusting the workforce to meet production.
There are certainly costs that vary due to personnel levels,
but as a production volume measure it is not well suited.
c. Direct Labor Hours
Aircraft program direct labor hours would
initially seem to be the best choice of a volume measurement.
It is as closely related to input as possible, and is
obviously the measure most related to direct labor costs.
However, the author believes its accurate predi ctabi 1 ty is
suspect, and management control is limited somewhat by direct
personnel availability, divisional distribution and overtime
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ceilings. Direct labor hours is the most common method of
measuring a labor intensive operation, but possibly there 3ire
other equally representative measures more closely
identifiable with output.
d. Workdays per Quarter
The number of- aircraft in production (in—house)
at any point in time is a meaningful measurement of activity
being performed if all aircraft are being worked on equally.
This measurement is simple, related to input and output, and
through turnaround time (TAT) estimates and induction
scheduling, it is also controlable. The difficulty is in how
to measure it.
A single count at some point during the quarter
(like the beginning or end) or an average is not a true
representation of quarterly activity* Measuring the number
of aircraft in—house on a daily basis and summing over the
entire quarter (in other words adding up all the days each
aircraft will be worked on during the quarter) gives the
total number of aircraft workdays per quarter and thus a
reasonable measure of production activity. And, if on the
average, rework on all types of aircraft airframes can be
considered comparable, then aircraft workdays for each type
of aircraft can be considered equivalent.
This measurement of volume is certainly not
perfect, for it may be influenced by labor related factors
such as artisan availability and distribution, training.
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experience and productivity from one type o-f aircraft to
another. In all, the author believes this to be the best
measure o-f volume available -for the purposes o-f this project
and will be used as the primary volume measurement throughout
the analysis procedures.
e. Aircra-ft per Quarter
Another interesting and possibly useful volume
dimension is a combination of workdays and actual turnaround
time into an equivalent unit computed by determining aircraft
percent completion per quarter. Dividing the number of
workdays an aircraft is in production during a quarter by its
turnaround time (total workdays to complete the entire job)
results in a rough estimate of the fraction of the rework job
completed during that quarter. Summing these fractions for
all aircraft of one type yields an approximation of the
number of aircraft completed that quarter. For example,
given three A—6 ' s were in production 10, 30 and 50 workdays
respectively during the quarter and each has a TAT of 100
workdays, then .1 + . 3 -«- .5 or equivalent to roughly .9 (90%)
of one A-6 was completed that quarter. This gives a relative
measure of output between the aircraft types, and a relative
assessment o-f activity from quarter to quarter within an
aircraft type-
What makes this attractive is being in units of
aircraft. It gives management an instant picture of
production output and is much simpler to relate to than input
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units such as hours. Also, i -F this aircra-ft per quarter
value is combined with hours per quarter, the resulting hours
per aircra-ft -figure provides an evaluation of relative
productivity. One drawback to the aircraft per quarter
measure arises in its equivalency across aircraft types.
Since the average turnaround times for the four major
aircraft types vary so widely, some method of weighting may
have to be di vised before comparison between aircraft types
is val id.
3. Aircraft Cataqories
Now that the primary volume measurements have been
determined, in the mul ti -product environment of the aircraft
program, it is important to decide which catagories of
aircraft should be used to collect volume data. Based on
budget norms for each SDLM subprogram and aircraft
type/model /series (TMS) , there Are over 15 unique catagories.
Considering the fact that no two aircraft have identical work
performed —there is always unique problems— there Ars as
many catagories as there are aircraft. Obviously there is no
benefit in considering each aircraft separately. Likewise,
attempting to relate volume to cost for every different
model /series would be impractical in many cases, for there
are insufficient numbers of some models reworked to create a
data base.
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With the aircra-ft program essentially involved in
air-Frames rework only and the air-frames structures o-f each
type aircra-ft being -fundamentally identical, in-fluences on
costs should not be expected beyond the -four basic types.
Another convincing reason is that quarterly cost data are
only available by type, not model or series. There-fore, the
conclusion must be to analyze the cost-volume relationships
for the aircrait program as a whole and the -four types o-f
aircra-ft only.
Tables 4.1 through 4.5 display the volume
measurements -for FY82-FY85 -for each o-f the -four aircra-ft
types and their relative share o-f the overall aircra-ft
program. Examination o-f this data reveals the close
similarities between the behavior o-f direct hours, workdays
and aircra-ft per quarter measurements. The coe-f -f icients o-f
correlation^ between these three volume measurements, range
-from .75 and .88, illusrating marked similarities.
This suggests that the use o-f either o-f these volume
dimensions in cost—volume analysis should produce somewhat
similar results. However, since there are at least subtle
di-f-f erences, all should be considered to attain the best
possible explanation o-f behavior.
^The coe-f -fici ent of correlation is a least squares method
o-f showing similarity in behavior o-f two variables measured
on a scale o-f O to 1, where O indicates no relation between






























































































































































































































































































































































































































1 . Job Order Accounting System
In order to properly evaluate the validity o-f any
cost-volume relationships in the aircra-ft program, it is
important to understand where the related costs originate.
NARF Alameda uses a job order system to accumulate costs to
an end product and overhead -function. Through this system
historical costs can be traced to either cost centers,
programs or products depending on whether they ArB direct or
indirect costs.
a. Direct Job Orders
In the case o-f the aircra-ft program, all aircra-ft
are assigned a direct job order number when inducted. From
then until physical completion all direct costs in the
catagories o-f labor, material and other services are charged
to this job number, as well as allocations -for overhead
expenses based on predetermined overhead rates per direct
labor hour. This method allows NARF to accumulate direct
costs to speci-fic programs, subprograms and products. CRef.
12: pp. 16,17:1
b. Indirect Job Orders
Indirect job orders are NARF—wide accounts used
to collect labor, material and other services costs that are
not readily identifiable with any product. This system
accumulates indirect costs to specific cost centers and
functional class code catagories (type of indirect cost i.e..
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supervision, training etc.). Indirect costs are not
traceable to a specific product or even a specific program.
Actual G&A overhead expenses are allocated to the six NARF
programs quarterly using direct hours as the basis. CRef.
12:pp. 16,17:
All indirect costs Are classified as either
production (PRDN) or general and administrative (G&A)
.
Production expenses include all indirect costs incurred by
production cost centers (divisions of the production
department) and those G&A expenses transferred from G?<A cost
centers. General and administrative expenses are similarly
indirect costs incurred by G&A cost centers (all
non-production divisions) less the transferred expenses.
CRef. 12:p. 173
e. Summary
The available information on cost distribution
through NARF ' s accounting system is: (1) direct and indirect
regular labor costs, overtime labor costs, material costs,
and other services costs for each of the eleven G&A cost
centers and six PRDN cost centers; (2) direct labor costs,
direct material costs, and other direct services costs for
each major program, subprogram, and type aircraft; and (3)
indirect costs by type (G&A OR PRDN), cost center, and
functional class code (FCC).
2. Direct Costs
The aircraft program, being one of six major programs
at NARF, represents an average of approximately 21"/. of NARF ' s
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total dollars spent each quarter (including overhead), 29% o-f
the direct labor costs, 107. o-f the direct material costs, and
107. of the other direct services costs. Examination o-f the
"be-fore transfer" cost center expenditures, as recorded from
quarterly cost center summaries, shows that eight of the
eleven GStA cost centers have recorded direct aircraft program
costs within the 16 quarter period under study. Of these,
the 5000 Production Planning and Control Department, with 87.
of the total, is the only G?<A cost center that is
significantly involved in the aircraft program- The
remaining G&A cost centers together account for only about
17.. Of the six PRDN cost centers, all but 9100 NAVAIR
Engineering Support Office and 9200 Weapons Systems Manager
accumulated aircraft program direct costs accounting for the
remaining 91yC.
The breakdown of percentages of direct costs by cost
center and cost catagory appears below in Table 4.6. The
original data for the 16 quarter period contain many
unexpl ainable large variations and negative values
(especially in the material and other catagories). As a
result, to provide a more meaningful illustration of the
direct cost distribution, the data was trimmed of all values




PERCENT OF AIRCRAFT PROGRAM DIRECT COSTS
BY COST CENTER
LABOR MATERIAL OTHER TOTAL
CC •/. (range) '/. (range) '/. (range) '/. (range)
9500 75 (66-86) 71 (63-89) 73 (43-91) 74 (66-84)
9300 14 (10-16) 20 (13-28) >1 (0-1) 15 (12-21)
500 7 (6-10) 4 (1-8) 24 (11-51) 8 (5-12)
9400 2 (1-3) 3 (1-6) >1 (0-1) 2 (1-3)
9600 1 (0-1) 3 (1-6) (O) 1 (1-2)
Other 111
3. Indirect Costs
NARF ' s total indirect costs sr^ approximately 11'/.
production expenses and IB'/, general expenses on the average
over the 16 quarter period. Trimming the data o-f outliers as
was done with the direct cost, percentages by cost center
were calculated to illustrate the breakdown among G&A cost
centers and PRDN cost centers. Results Ar^ shown in Table
4.7.
The majority o-f G&A expenses are incurred by the
2500, 5000, 6000 and 6500 cost centers. This is no real
surprize -for 5000 Production Planning and Control and 6000
Production Engineering (which includes the 6500 Plant
Services Division), a.r& the two largest and most production
support intensive departments who would be expected to have
potentially volume related indirect costs. The 2500 division
o-f the Management Controls Department, however, is not
directly associated with production and simply accumulates
material and other services overhead expenses otherwise
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unidenti-f i able with any other cost center. This division
would not be expected to have costs directly related to
production volume-
Si nee the 5000, 6000 and 6500 cost centers make such
a significant impact on NARF overhead costs and Are
production oriented, they are the main -focus o-f attention in
the analysis o-f aircrait program volume related indirect
expenses.
TABLE 4.7
PERCENT OF AIRCRAFT PROGRAM INDIRECT COSTS
BY COST CENTER
LABOR MATERIAL OTHER TOTAL
cc '^_ (ranqe) •A_ (ranqe) •^_ (ranqe) %_ (ranqe)
G&A COST CENTERS
0000 2 (1-3) >1 (0-2) 1 (0-7) 2 (1-3)
1000 6 (3-12) 1 (0-6) 1 (0-2) 3 (1-5)
2000 4 (3-6 1 (0-2) >i (0-1) 3 (2-5)
2500 4 (0-7) 51 (36-71) 92 (87-96) 40 (29-52)
4000 9 (8-13) 1 (0-3) ( 0- 1
)
5 (3-7)
5000 36 (29-42) 4 (0-9) 1 ( 0-3 19 (14-25)
6000 20 (14-35) 17 (7-26) 3 (1-8) 13 (9-15)
6500 17 (13-28) 27 (12-53) 1 (1-2) 14 (9-18)
7000 8 (4-10) 4 (3-10) (0) T (1-6)
8000 (0-1) 1 (1-5) (0) (0-1)
9000 2 (1-5) (0-1) (0) >1 (0-2)
PRDN COST CENTERS
9100 >1 (0-1) (0-1) 2 (1-5) >1 (0-1)
9200 11 (7-13) 2 (0-4) 23 (10-36) 9 (5-11)
9300 21 (19-23) 35 (26-47) 27 (14-34) 24 (21-30)
9400 29 (25-34) 22 (14-39) 25 (14-34) 27 (18-34)
9500 24 (17-30) 12 (6-20) 5 (2-9) 20 (15-25)
9600 15 (12-18) 27 (15-37) 18 (10-27) 18 (12-23)
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V. COST-VOLUME ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the cost—volume regression analysis
results of aircra-ft program costs, both direct and pertinent
associated NARF indirect, versus the volume measures
discussed in Chapter IV. Also presented are the computations
involved in constructing cost-volume curves -for the aircra-ft
program and its -four segments.
The purpose o-f using regression analysis in this project
is to determine the most Siccruate and reliable cost—volume
relationship possible. Simple (one explanatory variable) and
multiple (more than one) regression are explored using
current and lagged volume data. When using current data,
regression is attempted between costs and volumes o-f the same
quarter. With lagged data, regression is per-formed by
comparing costs o-f one quarter with volume data from one to
three quarters earlier. This latter technique is called
distributed lag. Since aircraft are in rework over several
quarters in some cases, the activity of previous quarters may
have an influence on current costs. All regression analysis
for this project was performed using MINITAB Version 5. 1 on
the NFS IBM 3033 mainframe computer.
As discussed in Chapter III, regression analysis is a
mathematical technique using the least squares method to
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determine the closest -Fitting linear relationship possible
between the dependent and independent variables. Regression
also provides a numerical evaluation o-F the si gni-f icance o-f
the calculated relationship but in no way an explanation o-f
the actual causes o-f cost behaviors.
The simplest to understand o-f the regression output
values is r^ (r-squared) , the coe-fficient o-f determination.
It is the square o-f r, the coe-f -f i ci ent o-f correlation, and
represents the percent o-f the dependent variable's variation
that is explained by the change in the independent variable.
In evaluating any regression results, veri-fying the basic
assumptions o-f the regression model is imperative. This is
accomplished through analyzing the residuals (the error
terms). Assumptions o-f the regression model are: (1) linear
relationship between variables; (2) normally distributed
residuals with a mean o-f zero; (3) -finite variance -for all
residuals; and (4) independence between residuals. CRe-f.
ll:pp. 24-26D
Before analysis is even performed it is known that the
assumption of independence among residuals is violated. This
is due to the time related trend in cost measurement referred
to as inflation. To remove this trend, the Implicit Gross
National Product Price Deflator for government goods and
services was applied to all costs. Table 5.1 shows the





IMPLICIT GNP PRICE DEFLATOR
GOVERNMENT GOODS AND SERVICES*
OTR FACTOR QTR FACTOR QTR FACTOR QTR FACTOR
821 100.0 831 102.7 841 106.6 851 110.1
822 100.1 832 103.7 842 107.4 852 110.6
823 100.2 833 104.5 843 107.6 853 110.9
824 102.0 834 105.3 844 108.6 854 111.2
Source: CRe-f. ll:p. 3873
A. DIRECT COSTS
In order to obtain the most aLCcurate description o-f cost
behaviors, the costs must be studied in their least
aggregated state. For the direct costs of the aircraft
program this is direct labor, direct material and other
direct services for each of the four aircraft program
segments.
1 . Direct Labor
Of all the costs associated with a production
operation, direct labor would be expected to exhibit the most
significant variable cost behavior- The regression results
has shown this to be true when comparing labor to the other
direct costs, but the results from one aircraft type to
another are inconsistent- Definite variable cost
relationships were found between direct labor costs and the
*A1 1 costs displayed in all tables and figures contained in
this thesis have been converted to 1982 constant dollar
values using the convertion factors in Table 5.1.
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volume measurements o-f direct labor hours, workdays and
aircra-ft per quarter.
Regression with direct hours resulted in an r^ o-f 98/C
or greater and a slope value o-f 16.0 to 16.5. Except -for
revealing the average 1982 constant dollar wage rate and that
no major di screpencies exist between labor hours and costs
recorded, the direct labor hours versus direct labor costs
relationship discloses no new i n-f ormation. Table 5.2
displays the regression results -for workdays and aircra-ft
volume measurements, where r^ is the coe-f -f ici ent o-f
determination, "a" is the constant term, and "b" is the slope








Ac-ft Segnlent r-sq 'd
80.57.
"a" "b"
A-6 *501.6 *1. 185/wkdy
P-3 44.7 363. 4 1.541
S-3 61.2 133.7 .817
A-3 0.4 837.4 -. 101
Aircraft as vol ume - -
A-6 76.87. $588.5 $134.4/ac-ft
P-3 21.2 532.5 102.0
S-3 54.5
-143.0 176.6
A-3 29.5 369.8 165.3
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The outcome o-f regression with workdays as the
independent variable was excellent for the A-6 segment,
satis-factory -for the P-3 and S-3 segments, and terrible for
the A—3 segment. Using aircra-ft per quarter as the volume
variable, the outcome was excellent for the A-6 segment,
satis-Factory -for the S-3 and A-3 segments, and poor -for the
P—3 segment.
Attempts were made to -find better results from any o-f
the current or lagged volume variables. Occassional ly direct
personnel and aircra-ft inductions demonstrated some variable
relationships with direct labor costs; however, all were much
less significant than workdays or aircraft per quarter. It
is interesting though that this happened at all, for both
personnel and inductions are considered very weak volume
measurements. Multiple regression was tried using personnel
or inductions as a second variable with workdays or aircraft
per quarter, but no significant additional variance
explanation occurred.
Inspection of the associated residuals with the
workday and aircraft per quarter regressions didn't reveal
any violations of the basic regression assumptions. To
ensure what relationships existed were in fact linear, cost
and volume variables were transformed to their logarithmic
equivalents. Regression of these transformations produced
only slight improvements in a couple cases, but nothing
significant enough to warrant the added confusion of using
logarithmic measurements.
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Some o-f the direct labor data is suspected to be
unreliable due to unreconci labl e negatives discovered during
collection. Inspection o-F the scatter graphs o-f direct labor
costs versus workdays and aircra-ft per quarter, identify some
data that can be classified as outliers. Figures 5.1 through
5.4 display these scatter graphs and the data considered
doubtful. Removal of these data points from regression
analysis dramatically improves the level of explanation of
cost variance and produces much higher confidence level
relationships. There is no way of verifying the validity of
this rational. However, without trimming the data, the
results Are unacceptable. Table 5.3 below gives the
regression results using the trimmed data.
TABLE 5.3L
REGRESSION RESULTS
DIRECT LABOR COST TRIMMED DATA
(dollars in thousands)
Workdays as volume


















P-3 36.8 230.6 136.0
S-3 46.5 24.9 151.0
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Figure 5.2 P-3 Segment Direct Labor Cost
Scatter Graphs
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Figure 5.4 A-3 Segment Direct Labor Cost
Scatter Graphs
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Interpretation o-F the direct labor costs versus
workdays and aircra-ft per quarter regression results is
greatly aided through graphing (see Figure 5.5). Although
direct labor costs are expected to be purely variable, the
data indicate they ars a mixed cost. However, the fixed
portion is relativey small when compared to the total
quarterly labor cost and thus approximates a variable cost.
Also this is the result o-f extending the linear relation
outside the relevant range. Below the relevant range the
relation may be different or even nonlinear. Within the
relavant range, the relation is considered valid and the
slope "b" actually describes the incremental cost of direct
labor for each additional workday or aircraft per quarter.
For example, these results indicate P-3s have the highest per
workday cost but the lowest per aircraft cost within the
relevant r.ange of historical data. This difference between
volume measurements can possibly be evaluated as the result
of the significantly shorter turnaround time for P-3s.
2. Direct Material
Throughout the rework of an aircraft, materials of
various kinds Are used during the many stages of SDLM. As
with labor, each aircraft accumulates varying material costs
at more irregular rates. Since all aircraft in-house Are
undergoing different stages of rework simultaneously, a
relatively constant average direct material cost rate per
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Figure 5.5 Graph of Direct Labor Cost
Regression Results
Un-f ortunately , this cannot be reliably demonstrated through
the regression analysis o-f the available direct material cost
data. The data is very erratic and even negative in some
quarters. Without removal o-f suspected outliers or bad data,
r= results were all less than 2'/.. Even a-fter data trimming,
the A—6 segment is the only one that produces a regression
confidence level o-f 95% or better (indicated by a T-ratio o-f
2.0 or greater). The trimmed direct material regression
results is shown in Table 5.4. As can be seen by the scatter
graphs in Figures 5.6 through 5.9, variable relationships are
apparent, but the variances are very large.
TABLE 5.4
REGRESSION RESULTS








P-3 19.0 158.6 .604
S-3 16. 1 140.3 .305
A-3 17.5 140.6 .622
Aircra-ft as volume
A-6 36.57. $350.3 *52.3/ac-ft
P-3 2.9 364. 1 22.5
S-3 0.6 343.4 14.6
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Figure 5.8 S-3 Segment Direct Material Cost
Scatter Graphs
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Figure 5.9 A-3 Segment Direct Material Cost
Scatter Graphs
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With the exception o-F the A-3 segment, where direct
material costs per workday indicating close to -fixed, the
regression results show some consistency between Aircra-ft
types. Further trimming o-f the A-3 data, as shown in Figure
5.9, brought the A-3 direct material costs to comparable
values with the other aircraft.
In contrast to direct labor, the constant terms -for
direct material costs are quite significant. In fact, the
results not only indicate that direct material may be a mixed
cost, but also, with slope terms as low as with the S-3
segment, it comes close to approximating a fixed cost.
3. Other Direct Services
Training, travel and other non— 1 abor , non-material
costs that can be specifically identified with direct job
orders are classified under other direct services. Although
this is termed a direct cost, a constant input of these costs
to each job is not expected. This is a highly unpredictable
cost, especially on a quarterly basis. As evident by the
quarterly data, it is also very difficult to properly record
in the accounting system. The presence of such frequent
negatives possibly indicates transfer or reclassification
adjustments for incorrect entries made one or two quarters
later. Regression of these cost data produced wide variances
and little, if any, relationship to volume measurements.
Again, the data were trimmed of obvious outliers.
Considering the magnitude of other direct services costs in
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comparison with labor and material (less than 1%) the
reliability o-f the regression results is of little impact on
the overall direct costs. As can be seen in Table 5.5, the
A—6 and S—3 data show an inverse incremental cost per unit
volume. Is this possible? It's more likely that other
direct services cost behavior is closer to fixed. Since the
reliabilty of this data over the short term is doubtful,
using the mean quarterly cost per type aircraft over the 16
quarter period is considered more descriptive.
TABLE 5.5
REGRESSION RESULTS
OTHER DIRECT SERVICES COSTS TRIMMED DATA
(dollars in thousands)
Workdays as volume
Constant Slope 16 Qtr
Acft Segmenit r-sq 'd
6.37.
"a" "b" Means
A-6 * 25.7 *-.019/v.ikdy $.018/wkdy
P-3 0.6 6.9 .011 .022
S-3 5.5 8. 1 -.005 .010
A-3 3.3 -0.6 .003 .007
Aircraft as volume




S-3 13.5 13.7 -1.6 1.670
A-3 38.0 -3.8 1.8 1.180
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B. INDIRECT COSTS
Analyzing the aircra-ft program indirect costs is a more
formidable task than is direct costs. First o-f all, it is
difficult to identify, with reasonable assurance, the
indirect costs associated with the aircraft program.
Secondly, the indirect costs vary for a variety of reasons,
making it complicated to isolate the effects of volume.
Thirdly, indirect costs are more discretionary in nature.
They can increase or decrease drastically within a single
catagory from one fiscal period to another depending on
managerial budgetary priorities. And fourthly, accounting
procedures change and functional cost catagories are
redefined periodically thus affecting long run consistency of
measurement
.
Since it is impossible to remove al 1 the effects of the
many influencing factors, any cost-volume relationships
discovered are of relatively low reliability. Unless a very
large number of observations are available (30 or more), it's
possible that not only inaccurate but totally incorrect
relationships may result. This is the main reason why the
analysis of indirect cost behavior must be tempered with
knowledge of the operations involved. All results must be
scrutinized to ensure they are sensable and reflect, with
reasonable assurance, the relationship described. In other
words, if roof repair costs vary with the number of aircraft
in process, a closer look at the data is needed.
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Keeping this latter point in mind, the author chose for
indirect cost analysis all 9500 Air-frames Division production
expenses and all general and production expenses transferred
to 9500 -from other cost centers. The Air-frames Division
essentially is the aircra-ft program. It charges from 85% to
90'/. of all its direct co&ts to the aircraft program and
accounts for a quarterly average of 74% of all aircraft
program direct costs. The expenses transferred to 9500 are
NARF management's assessment of those G&A and production
expenses that Ar^ identifiable with the aircraft program.
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect to observe some
relationship between these aircraft program associated
indirect costs and the aircraft volume measuresments.
The AircrA^t program indirect costs were analyzed as an
aggregate of labor, material and other costs for each
occurring Functional Classification Code (FCC). Since very
few of the FCCs contain significant amounts of material or
other costs, it would not be beneficial to analyze costs by
other than the total for each cost center FCC.
The titles of the 20 different G&A and production
transferred expenses and the 28 types of Airframes Division
expenses analyzed Are listed in Table 5.6. The Airframes
Division has actually charged expenses to 39 different FCCs
over the 16 quarter period, but some that Are very similar in
nature were grouped together for analysis.
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TABLE 5.6











GC,D Workload/Mat 1 Mgmt. MJ

















































Minor Equipment 9300 KB
Minor Equipment 9300 KC
Equip. Calib. 9300 KD
Safety Services 9300 TD
Prevent. Maint. 9400 KC
Corective Maint. 9400 KD
Minor Equipment 9400 LA











Source: CRef. 10: pp. 64-S33
s:
The same regression procedures were used as with direct
costs to obtain the best possible cost-volume relationships.
Data were plotted and closely examined to identi-fy outliers
that should be eliminated. Even though the use o-f direct
hours as the volume measure showed slightly better
relationships in a -Few cases, workdays and aircra-ft per
quarter measurements are considered the better choices and
most desirable choices with respect to matching up indirect
with direct cost regression results. Distributed lag was
attempted, but no significant outcomes sur-faced. The -Final
regression results o-F the trans-Ferred costs and the Air-Frames
Division indirect costs are presented in Table 5.7 and 5.S.
The regression results showed only 16 o-f the 48 workday
and 16 o-F the 48 aircra-Ft per quarter relationships attempted
were signi-Ficant , having an r^ o-F greater than 207. and a
T-ratio above the 95X con-Fidence level o-F 2.0 (T-ratios not
shown). O-F each 16, four were eliminated because the
variable component oi cost was close to zero or the cost's
variable behavior could not be justi-Fied (such as being
negative). In addition, the Air-Frames Division's shop
general (MJ) costs, with an r^ o-F less than 20/C, was added
because the low con-fidence results were considered valid.
For comparison purposes and -For later use when tabulating the
results, the means -For each -Fixed cost FCC are also displayed




AIRFRAMES DIVISION INDIRECT COSTS
(thousands)
Workdays as Volume Aircraft as Volume
Mixed Costs




MA *269.7 $.078/1 $281.0 $ 9.30/ac-ft
ME -216.5 . 101 -209.9 12.26
MG 7.7 .013 3. 3 1.84
MJ 108.3 .036 69. 1 6.03
NA,C -4.4 .062 -32.6 8.71
QA-E 9.0 .024 14. 1 2.76
TB,D,G -52.7 .034 -83. 1 5.59
Total
Mixed 121. 1 .348 41.9 46.48
Fi xed Costs













MC 0. 1 0. 1
MD 0.5 0.5
MF 0.7 0.7









INDIRECT COSTS TRANSFERRED TO AIRFRAMES DIVISION
(thousands)
Workdays as Volume Aircra-f t as Volume
Mixed Costs
Constant Slope Constant Slope
CC FCC
FB
"a" "b" "a" "b"
4000 $106.4 $.033/wkdy * 74.4 $ 5.44/ac-ft
5000 GA 239.4 .070 179.8 11.07
6000 KD -23.2 .012 -22.0 1.47
6000 LA -3.4 .009 -4.9 1. 16
6500 KE 7.6 .011 8.3 1.41
9300 KC 20.5 .015 129.2 2. 16
Total
Mixed 347.3 .150 254.8 22.71
Fixed Costs
CC FCC Mean Cost Mean Cost
5000 KD ^ 0.7 * 0.7
6500 AF 2.0 2.0
6500 KB 12.9 • 12.9
6500 KC 56.5 56.5
6500 KD 89.8 89.8
6500 ZA 1.3 1.3
9200 EA 66.2 66.2
9300 KB 11.9 11.9
9300 KD 31.5 31.5
9300 TD 0.9 0.9
9400 KC 0.3^ 0.3
9400 KD 1.0 1.0
9400 LA 18.3 18.3




Total *641.0 $. 150/wkdy *548.5 *22.7/ac-ft
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C. COST-VOLUME CURVES
Now that the regression analysis o-f the direct and
indirect costs with respect to the volume measurements have
been completed, the 16 quarter historical cost-volume curves
can be constructed -for each o-f the -four aircra-ft types and




The -fixed components o-f each curve will consist o-f
the sums o-f the fixed portions o-f direct labor, direct
material, other direct services and all indirect costs. In
the case o-f direct labor and material, the fixed portion is
simply the intercept value "a" of the regression results.
The other direct services costs are considered totally fixed;
therefore, the 16 quarter mean is used. For the indirect
costs, the fixed portion is the sum of the intercept values
of the mixed costs and the means of the fixed costs of the
9500 division's production (PRDN) expenses and transf erred-in
expenses, plus the 16 quarter mean of the remaining NARF G8<A
expenses.
Percent of direct labor hours is used to allocate
remaining G&A to the aircraft program. An allocation factor
based on the applicable volume measure is used to distribute
the aircraft program fixed indirect costs between the four
aircraft segments.
2. Variable Components
The variable components of each curve will consist of
the sums of the weighted averages of the slope values "b"
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(weighted by '/. workdays or aircra-ft per quarter as
applicable) of direct labor, direct material, and the slopes
o-f the indirect mixed costs. The variable portion o-F the
-four aircra-ft segments' mixed costs must be assumed to be
equal to the Air-frames Division variable value, -for there is
no way to determine otherwise. Tables 5.9 through 5.13 show
the breakdown o-f the -fixed and variable components o-f each
cost—volume curve. Table 5.14 summarizes the -fixed and
variable components o-f each segment and Figure 5.10 shows
the graphs o-f the resultant total cost-volume relationships.
3. Evaluation o-f Results
Comparing the -final cost—volume relationships o-f each
segment, it can be seen that the P-3 segment has the highest
per workday variable cost rate, the A—3 and A-6 segments
being next highest and the S—3 segment being significantly
lower. This follows the observed behavior of direct labor
costs, as would be expected since they are the major
contributor to the variable component. For the per aircraft
variable cost rates this pattern is not the same. Here, the
P—3 segment dropped to the lowest while the others remained
in the same relative ranking, as again was the case with
direct labor. This can possibly be explained, at least in
part, by the fact that on the average the P-3 segment has
considerably shorter turnaround times (TAT) than the other
segments —averaging about 85 workdays compared to 130, 170











Mater i al 747.0 1423.3
Other 43.7 *1548.5 43.7 $2379.
5
Indirect
9500 Prdn 539.7 460.5
Trans G&A 641.0 541.9
Other GStA 6388.3 :$7569.0 6388.3 *7390.7
Total Fixed *9117.5 *9770.2
Variable Component
Direct
Labor 1 .275 151.3
Material .465 :51-740/wkdy 30.2
Indirect
9500 Prdn .349 46.5
Trans G&A . 151 % .500/wkdy 22.7
*181.5/acft
* 69.2/ac-ft
Total Variable J:2.240/wkdy *250.7/acft
Cost-Volume Curves:
Cost = 9117 + 2.24 X Wkdys





















Material .475 $1.917/wkdy 52.3 $211.Q/acf
t
Indirect
9500 Prdn .349 46.5
Trans G&A .151 3? .500/wkdy 22.7 $ 69.2/ac-Ft
Total Variable $2.417/wkdy $280. 2/ ac-ft
Cost-Volume Curves:
Cost = 2898 + 2.42 x Wkdys





















14. 1 $ 608.8
*2387.2




Material .604 4?2.393/wkdy 22.1 5
Indirect
9500 Prdn .349 46. 5






Cost = 1929 + 2.89 x Wkdys




















9. 1 * 377.5
*1788.6




Materi al .305 ^1.019/wkdy 14.6
Indirect
9500 Prdn .349 46.5






Cost = 2682 + 1.52 x Wkdys















10.57. Ac-ft ^ 776.0




Material .622 ^2.094/wkdy 25.2 $214.5/ac-ft
Indirect
9500 Prdn .349 46.5
Trans G&A .151 ^ .500/wkdy 22.7 $ 69.2/ac-ft
Total Variable :^2.594/wkdv S2BZ.7/acft
Cost—Volume Curves;
Cost = 1480 + 2.59 x Wkdys
Cost = 1480 + 284 x Ac-ft
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However, ranking by average turnaround times does not hold up
in comparing the A-6, S-3 and A-3 segments per aircra-ft
variable cost rates. The A-3 segment is the highest, which
matches, but the A-6 segment's per aircraft variable cost
component is almost equal to the A-3 segment's (yet TAT is
about hal-f) and $46,000 per aircra-ft higher than the S-3
segment. It is obvious then that there must be other -factors
(such as relative productivities or production methods)




















































































In order to properly use the cost-volume relationship
derived through regression analysis, there are several
preliminary steps that must be accomplished in order to
attain the volume measurements to be used and logically




It's extremely important that volume estimates be as
accurate as possible- The induction and completion dates o-f
all aircra-ft expected to be in-house during the quarter o-f
interest are all the information needed to calculate the
volume measurements, both workdays per quarter and aircra-ft
per quarter. From aircrei-ft job completion reports reviewed
by the author, actual TATs were rarely equal to or below
scheduled. Every e-f-fort should be made to ensure that TAT
estimates are realistic and take into account probable
delays. Then once calculated, applying the volume values to
the cost—volume relationships will yield an estimate o-f the
average overall aircra-ft program or segment costs (in 1982
dol 1 ars)
.
2. Evaluation o-f Errors
Since the predicted cost at any given volume is only
an estimate of the average costs using only 16 quarters of
data (of sometimes questionable accuracy), an understanding
of the cost distribution about the resultant regression line
is important. A standard error of estimate (SEE) was
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computed as part o-f the regression analysis for each variable
cost component o-f the final cost-volume relationship.
Assumming the cost-volume data Bre normally distributed about
the regression line, which was con-firmed through observation
o-f the residuals (error terms) being randomly distributed
around zero, there's approximately a 67% probability o-f the
variable costs being within plus or minus one SEE o-f the
predicted average value at any volume within the revelant
range. This is not the total possible error involved,
however, for the SEEs are those resulting from regression of
costs contributing only to the variable component of the
cost—volume relationships. The majority of the fixed
component costs were computed using the 16 quarter means of
the individual costs which all have an associated standard
deviation. Therefore, the variable component and the fixed
component have errors of distribution associated with the
estimation of the aircraft program or segment costs.
Table 5.15 lists the results of summing the variable
and fixed error terms for each cost—volume expression. These
summed errors probably overestimate the value of the standard
error of estimate for the resultant cost-volume curves, for
summing errors is not mathenati cal ly valid. However, knowing
the range of the possible error in estimation is definitely
important, for then management can at least evaluate the
extremes, worst and best cases, for decision purposes.




OF THE COST-VOLUME MODELS
(thousands)
Workdays as Volume
ACFT Dir Labor Dir Mat'l Indirect Total Fi xed
Segment SEE SEE SEE SEE
* 282
St. Dev.
A-6 $ 87 $175 *19 $ 639
P-3 177 163 18 359 420
S-3 148 170 12 330 607
A-3 107 165 8 280 309
AC PROG 371 724 22 1116 2011
Aircra-ft as Volume
A-6 $118 $182 $19 S 319 $ 645
P-3 229 178 18 427 649
S-3 164 185 12 362 486
A-3 85 165 8 257 211
AC PROG 525 714 22 1261 2011
factors that may in-fluence program costs can narrow this cost
range and guide management toward a higher confidence
estimate.
Productivity has a definite influence on costs. For
instance, in FY85, it can be seen from the volume data
displayed in Tables 4.1 through 4.5 that the measurement
hours/aircraft (a very rough productivity dimension) jumped
significantly in the A-6, P—3 and A-3 segments indicating a
productivity drop. The reason for this is not known, but
aircraft and workday variable costs for that period have high
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"positive" error terms (actual costs were above the
regression line). Estimation o-f training levels or recent
actual productivity trends may predict whether to expect
above or below average productivity and thus costs below or
above the cost—volume curve.
Direct or indirect personnel levels can certainly
adversely or positively a-f-fect productivity and program
costs. Workload changes -from quarter to quarter can easily
cause an over or under—sta-Ffing, -for personnel adjustments
always require long range planning. As can be seen by the
graphs in Figure 5.11, the personnel level bottomed out at
the end o-f FY84 beginning o-f FY85 (quarter 12 and 13 o-f the
16 quarter period), and has been climbing in FY85. Since
volume has not signi -f i cantly increased, over sta-f-fing may
have occurred and contributed to higher costs. Knowledge o-f
such a situation gx /es the manager con-fidence in believing
costs will tend above the average cost—volume relationship.
Volume changes -from quarter to quarter are inevitable
and certainly can be expected to push costs above or below
average. Not only does a change in volume in-fluence costs,
but also the direction, duration and rate o-f the volume
change. To determine whether any pattern o-f in-fluence could
be observed over the 16 quarter period, the quarterly changes
in the two volume measurements, workdays and aircra-ft, were
compared to the residuals o-f each segment's direct labor cost






































Figure 5.11 NARF and Air-frames Division Personnel
Strengths -for FY82-FY85
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plots o-f the quarterly volume changes and the direct labor
cost residuals'* together -for comparison. The residuals are
plotted a second time to compare them with the volume changes
o-f the previous quarter. From these plots some patterns can
be observed, especially in the A-6 and A-3 segments (Figures
5.12 and 5.15). Indications Are that the residuals move in
the direction o^ volume changes. This means increases or
decreases in volume result in costs tending toward above or
below average respectively.
The rate o-f volume change and duration also appear to
a-f-fect residual behavior. The sharper the volume change, the
more instantaneous is cost response. With more gradual but
continually increasing or decreasing volume changes, costs
tend to lag volume changes by one or two quarters and are
more resistant to reversals.
By all means this is not conclusive evidence, -for the
P-3 and S—3 segments show the opposite in a couple o-f
instances. However, this certainly indicates the possibility
o-f predictable cost responses to the workload -fluctuations
inherent in the NARF aircra-ft program. This kind o-f
knowledge would obviously be valuable and is certainly worth
further research. For example, with a sharp increase in
volume this quarter, being able to predict with some
™Only direct labor was used because it is the most
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Figure 5.12 Comparison o-f A-6 Segment Volume Changes
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Figure 5-13 Comparison o-f P-3 Segment Volume Changes
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Figure 5.14 Comparison o-f S-3 Segment Volume Changes
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Figure 5.15 Comparison of A-3 Segment Volume Changes
with Direct Labor Cost Residuals
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probability a segment's costs should be significantly above
average next quarter, even though slightly below average now,
would greatly assist negotiating aircra-ft prices.
Further study may indicate di-fferent cost responses
exist -for each of the aircra-ft segments. It's possible that
production methods, such as the P-3's moving line, or other
efficiency factors peculiar to an aircraft type may also
influence cost response to volume changes. With more
reliable data and a more sophisticated analysis, specific
probabilities of cost response to volume changes or other
factors could be learned.
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VI. BREAK-EVEN ANALYSIS
Up to this point the focus has been solely on the costs
associated with the aircra-ft program and its segments. In
order to make meaning-ful use o-f this cost behavior knowledge,
it must be compared to the revenues o-f the program to assess
its net income status. As was discussed in part C. o-f
Chapter III, break-even analysis compares the cost-volume
relations with the revenue—volume relations and provides the
means to estimate how current or projected workloads will
a-f-fect an operation's net income.
A. REVENUE DETERMINATION
1 . Matching Costs and Revenues
Revenue -for the NARF Alameda aircra-ft program comes
from the individual SDLM rework jobs accomplished on -fleet,
reserve and RDTS<E aircra-ft. The amount NARF is compensated
for each aircra-ft is based on the -fixed price established -for
each aircra-ft TMS -for the quarter in which inducted.
In order to properly compare costs to revenue in a
break-even analysis, it is imperative that costs and revenues
be matched as closely as possible. Since a single aircra-ft
is rarely inducted and completed all in a single quarter,
quarterly revenue is di-f-ficult to match with quarterly
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expenses. Assumming all casts incurred during a fiscal
quarter are recorded by the job order system, and their
behaviors are re-flected in the cost-volume relationships
derived in Chapter V, then what is needed to match these
costs are equivalent average quarterly revenue-volume
relationships over this period -for the aircraft program and
each of its segments.
Percent completion is an accepted manner with which
to recognize revenue for periods much less than the length of
a project. Normally this involves determining the percent of
total budgeted or estimated costs incurred during a period
and applying it to the total expected revenue. Thus, xV. of
project costs for the period are matched with xX of the
revenue.
2. Calculating Revenue
The only per quarter measure of job completion
readily available on a historical basis is workdays per
quarter. This measure is derived from the physical induction
and completion dates. Considering that on the average within
the aircraft program and its segments costs are distributed
evenly over each workday an aircraft is in—house, the revenue
received for that aircraft can be likewise distributed. This
means the percent completion per quarter can be calculated
using the workdays during the quarter and the total estimated
workdays to complete the job. Since historical data are
being used in this case, the percent completion is based on
the actual total workdays required.
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Applying the percent completion -factors to each
aircraft's fixed price distributes the aircraft's revenue
over the quarters it is in-house. Summing all aircraft
revenue per quarter gives the total aircraft program or
segment revenue per quarter and is displayed in Table 6.1.
From quarterly workday and aircraft per quarter totals,






A-6 P-3 S-3 A-3 ACFT
QTR Segment Segment Segment Segment Program
821 $4327 $3710 4:1721 $1576 $12105
822 4574 3622 1994 1761 12529
823 4440 3339 1916 1717 12100
824 4021 2427 1671 1653 10298
831 3931 2527 1365 1462 9287
832 3326 2875 1492 1899 9594
833 3054 3382 1603 2237 10278
834 2520 3518 1356 2349 9744
841 2470 3731 1493 2308 10004
842 3147 4596 1701 2127 11571
843 3880 3964 1922 1694 11461
844 3658 3154 2254 1229 10295
851 4126 3753 2793 1691 12364
852 4748 4278 3286 2047 14360
853 5565 4757 3485 2215 16023
854 6129 5742 3991 2598 18462
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3. Evaluating the Results
There Are two possible revenue rates that can be
calculated -from the data, one including FY85 revenues and one
Mithout (see Table 6.2 below). As can be seen by reviewing
the quarterly revenues, FY85 values are signi-Ficantl y higher
than those in FYa2-84. During FY85 aircraft prices were
heavily subsidized -for recoupement o-f losses incurred in
FY84. These FY85 data distort the overall 16 quarter
revenue—volume trend. Using "no constant" regression
analysis (where the regression line passes through the
TABLE 6.2


















A-6 $398 $862 $537 $280/acft
P-3 416 666 478 228
S-3 298 535 361 235
A-3 675 1037 773 284
AC PROG; 414 715 497 251
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origin) the FY82-84 data produced high con-fidence results
(r^ o-f 10'/. or more). However, it can also be considered that
since the FY85 recoupement made up for past losses, then this
higher rate matches more closely with costs on the average
over the 16 quarter period.
B. BREAK-EVEN CHARTS
Figures 6.1 through 6.5 graph the -fixed and variable
costs and the two revenue rates (FY82-84 and FY82-85) as
break—even charts -for the aircra-ft program and its segments.
Further example revenue rates are plotted on the charts to
demonstrate the range o-f revenue rates that are applicable
within the relevant ranges (ranges o-f volumes occurring over
the 16 quarter period) to meet the costs described by the
average 16 quarter cost—volume curve.
1 . Break-Even Volume
The level o-f activity where revenues a.r^ equal to
total costs is called the break—even point or break—even
volume. The break-even volume is dependent on both the -fixed
and variable components o-f the costs associated with an
aircra-ft segment. Lowering either will cause a reduction in
the break—even volume. For instance, in the case o-f aircra-ft
program, dropping the fixed costs ^100,000 will decrease the
break—even volume by 50 workdays per quarter (about 1/C) . To
reduce the break-even volume the same amount with variable
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Figure 6.1 Aircra-ft Program Break-even Charts
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Figure 6.5 A—3 Segment Break—even Charts
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As is well illustrated by the break-even charts, the
relative di f -Ferences between the slopes o-f the variable cost
and revenue lines is critical. I-f the slopes are equal or
divergent, obviously break—even cannot occur. The revenue
rate must be su-f -f i cientl y greater than the variable
incremental cost rate to attain a desirable break—even
volume.
«
2. Evaluation o-F Break-even
It must be kept in mind that these break-even charts
aire simply approximations o-f past performance. The
cost—volume relations can be expected to represent -Future
constant 1982 dollar costs 67/C o-f the time within plus or
minus one standard deviation. However, the revenue rates are
totally discretionary and in these charts only represent the
average conditions over the 16 quarter period. Overall, they
illustrate what is already known about the profitability o-f
the aircraft program; that it's been well below break—even
over this period. This is why the higher FY85 revenue rates
were authorized. Using these higher average revenue rates it
can be seen that break-even comes closer to, and in many
cases, within the relevant range and thus the average loss is
greatly reduced.
Table 6.3 displays the break-even volumes using the
FYa2-84 and FY82-85 revenue rates. Also presented are the
mean losses per quarter incurred by each segment. These mean
loss per quarter figures are calculated using each segment's
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mean volume per quarter and the higher FY82-85 revenue rates,
The S—3 segment has averaged the greatest losses over the
period at :^1.5 million plus. The A-6 segment's average loss
o-f nearly $1 million per quarter is the most consistent when
comparing the two volume measurement outcomes. And in
contrast, the P-3 disparity between per workday and per
aircra-ft results appears once again, showing essentially
break-even under per workday calculations and over a $1











A-6 3445 1468 987 950 , 000
P-3 835 627 631 44,000
S-3 6440 3571 934 1 , 980 , 000
A-3 1480 910 469 717,000
AC PROG 6406 4491 3065 2,895,000
Aircra-ft as Volume
(aircra-ft) (ac-ft/qtr)
8. 1A-6 26.0 . 11.9 980,000
P-3 16.0 12.0 7.9 1,021,000
S-3 34.0 17.3 5.9 1,428,000
A-3 3.8 3.0 2.5 258 , 000
AC PROG 60.3 39.7 24.6 3,718,000
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C. BREAK-EVEN APPLICATION
Knowledge o-f the relative pro-fit or loss situation o-F the
past 16 quarters cannot predict -future income prospects, but
unless action is taken to control the outcome, similar
results, whether desirable or not, are likely to repeat.
Using tools such as break—even analysis, "what i-f" accounting
can be played on a quarterly basis with various possible
induction schedules and BircrAit mixes. In each situation
the revenue rate required to break-even can be determined.
Whether it's negotiating -fixed prices or adjusting induction
schedules to meet the "needs o-f the -fleet," break—even
analysis can assist in leading to the optimum decision.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1 . Regression Accuracy
Through regression analysis o-f 16 quarters o-f
historical aircra-ft program cost data, the cost—volume
relations can be considered only as accurate as the data
used. During the data collection process, the author
observed several very large negative direct labor charges to
the S—3 and A—3 segments and a -few smaller ones to the P-3
program. The author was unable to reconcile these obvious
irregularities, which were removed -from analysis. How these
irregularities should have been distributed over other
quarters is not known. It certainly raises doubts as to the
reliability o-f the S—3 and A—3 segments and maybe the P-3
segments as well.
It was obvious during data collection that the A—
6
segment data were more meticulously recorded and would
produce more accurate and consistent results. The regression
analysis o-f direct labor re-flected this, with the A-6 segment
exhibiting considerably higher con-fidence results than the
others. This demonstrates that accurate recording procedures
are possible and with them more meaning-ful and use-ful results
are achieved-
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2. Application o-f Results
NARF Alameda has su-f-fered for many years with cost
ouverruns, restricted personnel policies and widely
fluctuating workload levels. Accurate and timely income
status is essential to any operation regardless whether it's
non-profit or not. The break-even chart, which is a
comination of cost and revenue relations versus volume, can
provide this, but is only as good as the user's ability to
interpret the results obtained from using it.
This interpretation ability is probably more
important than the actual cost—volume relationships
themselves. Being able to take all influencial factors into
account to estimate the probability of being on, above or
below the average cost for any given volume is crucial.
Although findings are far from conclusive, inferences
concerning the effects of personnel staffing, productivity,
and rate, duration and direction of volume changes can be
drawn. What can be concluded is that these effects exist and
with the proper study are predictable. Armed with this
information, significant improvements to cost estimation and
elimination of cost overruns can be made.
3. Overal 1 Success
The original objective of this thesis project was to
explore the effects of workload variations on the related
costs of the aircraft program and its four segments. If a
reasonable relationship could be derived between costs and
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volume, a model would be constructed for each o-f the -four
segments as management decision support in negotiating
aircra-ft fixed prices, workload and mix.
The objectives of this thesis project have been
attained but with only limited success. Applying the theory
of cost-volume analysis in the mul ti -product , multi -program,
complex environment of a Naval Air Rework Facility was more
difficult than originally imagined. Considering the fact
that an insufficient number of data periods were available
through historical records and several cost data
descrepencies could not be reconciled, the results do furnish
a reasonable description of aircraft program associated
cost—volume relationships over the past four years.
If nothing else, this study has provided a
significant beginning to understanding and predicting future
aircraft program cost—volume behaviors. The accuracy or
reliability of the specific cost-volume relationships are not
as important as the potential information they represent.
There is no doubt that these relationships can be improved
upon. With a greater focus on recording data specifically
for analysis of this type, reliability will soar. Also, with
rigorously verified cost and volume data, matched
consistantly over equal time periods, the subtle differences
between aircraft segments will stand out more clearly. This
thesis is the platform from which to seek better managerial
control over cost-volume behavior.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Since this thesis project was requested by the NARF
Alameda Deputy Comptroller, it is appropriate to make a -Few
recommendations with respect to the -future use and
development o-f cost—volume relationships. These
recommendations are meant not as criticism but as suggestions
intended to improve the prospects o-f cost-volume in-formation
becoming a viable and e-f-fective decision support aid -for NARF
management. In these times oi shrinking budgets and greater
emphasis on minimizing Naval Industrial Fund (NIF) losses,
pressures to optimize e-fficiency and reduce cost and
turnaround time overruns will undoubtedly increase.
1 . Data Management
A data management system should be designed and
implemented that is suitable -for collecting, storing and
manipulating specific cost and production data. Cost data
are currently recorded mainly -for the purpose o-f periodic
reports only. None is intentionally kept as a historical
data base -for analytical purposes. With the advent o-f
desktop computing and megabyte storage devices, no longer is
physical space a limitation to retaining historical data.
Through the use o-f a well designed data management system,
not only is it possible to collect pertinent cost data -for
various cost analysis uses, but the methods o-f collection can
be re-fined and verification can be emphasized.
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2. Data Aggregation
Aircra-ft program segment cost items should be broken
down to the SDLM task level by direct labor and material. To
seriously expect to observe subtle cost behavior changes due
to volume or other -factor variations, the aircra-ft program
associated cost data must be recorded in the least aggregated
segments as possible. Although recording data in this detail
is more complex, the bene-fits may be worth the trouble. With
the many di-f-ferent models/series in each aircra-ft segment,
SDLM task cost—volume data could significantly improve cost
estimation.
Serious attempts should be made to track indirect
costs, speci-f ical ly 6&A and production expenses trans-ferred
to the air-frames division, to individual segments o-f the
aircra-ft program. The indirect job order system provides
trans-ferred costs by program only. There is no cost—volume
knowledge to gain -from allocated costs. Tracing at least
some indirect costs to aircra-ft type would strongly enhance
the validity and utility o-f cost-volume results.
3. Data Matching
Procedures should be implemented to ensure desired
data are recorded accurately and consistently, and in the
time period occurred. It can't be overemphasized how
important it is to match costs and other data to the correct
time period. When errors Are discovered or unexpected
trans-fers must occur, appropriate adjustments in the
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historical data base must accompany, as -far back as
necessary, or else cost behavior details and accuracy will be
irretrievably lost.
Cost planning and monitoring should be improved to
ensure budget cycle adjustments are not required. Large
fluctuations in various costs were -frequently observed in the
last or first quarter of a fiscal year. There were no yearly
patterns, but certainly costs were being recorded in these
quarters that didn't match workload accomplishments.
A method of recording revenues should be devised that
will reasonably match quarterly revenues with costs incurred.
If accurate break—even analysis is desired, it's imperative
that costs are aligned perfectly. A percent completion
method based on estimated costs is one method to couple costs
and revenues. With accurate cost recording, precise
break—even status can be easily maintained.
4. Collection Period
Volume, cost, revenue and other pertinent data should
be recorded and tracked on a monthly basis. In order to
improve the confidence level of regression or any other type
of cost analysis technique, not only must the data be
accurate, but it must be sufficient in numbers.
Statistically, a minimum of 30 data points is optimum. On a




A greater understanding o-F the e-f-Fects o-F volume
changes on costs should continue to be sought. Certainly a
more accurate cost—volume model can be produced i-f other
volume -factors, such as rate, direction and duration o-f
change, can be included. With two or three years o-f tight
monthly data, more signi-ficant -findings may be attainable.
Although this project does not solve any specific problem or
provide any precise decision support aids, it does establish
the basis -for better, more fruitful analysis of cost—volume
behavior. With whatever resources are available, internal or
external, further study should be sought so that eventually
significant knowledge can be realized that will benefit the
cost efficiency of Naval Air Rework Facilities.
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